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ESSAY
THE SCIENCE OF GATEKEEPING: THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S NEW




With its 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court abolished the seventy-
year-old Frye test for evaluating scientific evidence and, instead,
required that courts conduct an independent inquiry into the
reliability and relevance of proffered scientific testimony. To assist
judges in negotiating the post-Daubert legal landscape, the Federal
Judicial Center has recently published a Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence. In this essay, Conley and Peterson evaluate
the Manual with a critical eye toward whether it is likely to lead
judges to the kinds of understanding demanded by the new
evidentiary regime. They praise several of the Manual's reference
guides for their engaging question-and-answer formats and their
comprehensive overviews of individual scientific disciplines.
However, they fault the Manual for its failure to emphasize
connections between topics and the absence of an interdisciplinary
introduction to the scientific method. Therefore, while the Manual
will serve as an authoritative reference on particular topics, Conley
and Peterson worry that judges may, after finding a section of the
Manual useful in a particular case, inappropriately extend their
limited knowledge of scientific principles in subsequent cases.
* A.B., Harvard; J.D., Ph.D., Duke. William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The authors thank Sheryl Gerety for her
research assistance. Special thanks are due to UNC colleague Walker Blakey for
suggesting the topic of this essay.
** B.S., Wisconsin; M.S., Ph.D., Stanford. Dr. Peterson recently retired as a statistics
professor from Duke University, where he taught for more than twenty years. He is
currently president of PRI Associates, Inc., a statistical consulting and software firm based
in Durham, N.C.
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INTRODUCTION
The federal judiciary's love-hate relationship with scientific
evidence dates back at least to 1908. In that year, in Muller v.
Oregon,' the Supreme Court received the eponymous "Brandeis
brief." Louis Brandeis, defending an Oregon statute that limited the
working hours of women, submitted "a very copious collection" of
authorities purporting to show the particular vulnerability of women
in the turn-of-the-century workplace.2 The Court upheld the law,
commenting on Brandeis' submission with sibylline brevity: "It may
not be amiss, in the present case, before examining the constitutional
question, to notice the course of legislation as well as expressions of
opinion from other than judicial sources."3 Drawing on Brandeis'
brief, the Court found "[t]hat woman's physical structure and the
performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the
struggle for subsistence."4
Since Muller, the courts' attitudes toward science in the
courtroom have run the gamut from uncritical enthusiasm to
dismissive Luddism, with stops at all intermediate points. Just
nineteen years after Muller, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. led the
Supreme Court into the depths of evangelical credulity with his
infamous opinion in Buck v. Bell upholding the compulsory
sterilization of "imbeciles" on the basis of turn-of-the-century theories
of intelligence testing.5 A generation later, in footnote eleven of its
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court turned to science
to support its finding of constitutional fact that separate education is
inherently unequal.6 In the 1970s, as employment discrimination
litigation proliferated, the Court plunged into detailed questions of
scientific method, endorsing particular tests of the statistical sig-
nificance of racial disparities in hiring.7 Over the last ten years,
1. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). For a further discussion of the history of scientific evidence,
see DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION:
METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE 3-10 (1986).
2. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419.
3. Id.
4. Id at 421.
5. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). For a review of Buck and its history, see John M.
Conley, "The First Principle of Real Reform": The Role of Science in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 65 N.C. L. REV. 935 (1987).
6. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
7. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.14 (1977) (endorsing
the proposition that employer's denial of discrimination will be "suspect" where
representation of protected group in employer's workforce is more than two or three
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particularly in its death penalty jurisprudence, the Court has displayed
a more skeptical attitude toward scientific evidence. Sometimes this
skepticism has expressed itself in the form of detailed critiques of
particular research;' at other times, Court majorities have questioned
whether broad-based scientific studies can ever be probative of
individual constitutional violations.' Categorizing trends in the lower
courts' reception of scientific evidence would be a book-length
undertaking. For background purposes, suffice it to say that one can
find case support for almost any side of nearly every scientific
question that has ever come before the courts,'
Now, eighty-eight years after Muller, the Federal Judicial Center
has intervened in an effort to bring some order to the chaotic world
of forensic science. The stated purpose of the Center's newly
published Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence is "to assist judges
in managing expert evidence, primarily in cases involving issues of
science or technology."" Such cases, the Manual observes, "chal-
lenge the ability of judges and juries to comprehend the issues-and
the evidence-and to deal with them in informed and effective ways.
As a result, they tend to complicate the litigation, increase expense
and delay, and jeopardize the quality of judicial and jury decision
making."'
2
The Manual's assistance comes not a moment too soon. In its
1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the
Supreme Court abolished the venerable Frye test for evaluating
scientific evidence. Under Frye, trial courts had to determine simply
whether the expert's methods were generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community.4  Under Daubert, however, courts must
standard deviations below what would be expected on basis of population data); Castenada
v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1976) (same).
8. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 170-73 (1976) (criticizing studies
intended to show bias of guilt-phase juries in capital cases).
9. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-95 (1987) (questioning whether
social science data can ever prove sentencing to be racially discriminatory in any particular
case).
10. For comprehensive treatments of the history and current state of scientific
evidence, see Symposium, Scientific Evidence After the Death of Frye: Daubert and Its
Implications for Toxic Tort, Pharmaceutical and Product Liability Cases, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1745 (1994); Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481 (1995) [hereinafter Developments].
11. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1
(1994) [hereinafter MANUAL].
12. Id.
13. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
14. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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conduct an independent inquiry into the reliability and relevance of
the methods the expert has used."5 While there is scholarly debate
over whether Daubert intended any material change in the day-to-day
practices of trial judges, 6 there is a widely shared judicial perception
that Daubert has made the trial courts' "gatekeeping" burden far
more onerous that it used to be.'7 A common reaction is that the
Supreme Court is demanding that trial judges become "amateur
scientists." 8
Although the Federal Judicial Center made the decision to create
a science manual well before Daubert,"9 the case brought both
urgency and focus to the project. Whatever its ultimate implications,
Daubert plainly signified that federal judges had to become intelligent
critics of scientific evidence-right now. Daubert also made clear that
the most important criterion of admissibility would be whether the
work of an expert followed the canons of the scientific method."
Judges must therefore be able to recognize valid scientific
methodology in an unlimited range of contexts and to distinguish it
from artifice disguised by the trappings of science.
The purpose of this essay is to assess the likelihood that the
Manual will actually help trial judges to negotiate the post-Daubert
legal landscape. We begin with an overview of the Manual and some
pertinent pieces of its history. We then review the Daubert case, with
particular attention to the understanding of "science" that it embodies
and the practical burdens that it imposes on trial courts. Against this
background, we next consider the intellectual skills that post-Daubert
trial judges need to develop, as" well as the fallacies they need to
avoid. Finally, examining in detail four of the Manual's substantive
scientific sections, we ask whether the Manual is likely to lead judges
to the kind of understandings that the new evidentiary regime
demands.
15. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
16. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th
Cir. 1995) (on remand from Supreme Court); Developments, supra note 10, at 1509-10;
Amy T. Schtitz, Note, The New Gatekeepers: Judging Scientific Evidence in a Post-Frye
World, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1060 (1994).
18. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
19. See MANUAL, supra note 11, at vii (discussing history of project).
20. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE MANUAL
The Manual consists of three principal sections: a two-chapter
Overview;2' seven reference guides,'m each dealing with a branch of
forensic science that plays a prominent role in contemporary
litigation; and a section on Extraordinary Procedures,' with one
chapter on court-appointed experts and one on special masters.
Although the reference guides, all written by prominent forensic
scientists, comprise nearly two-thirds of the Manual and represent its
intellectual core, it is the Overview that has generated the most
controversy so far.24 The Overview includes a "Management of
Expert Evidence" chapter by Senior District Judge William W.
Schwarzer, retiring Director of the Center,' and an "Evidentiary
Framework" chapter by Professor Margaret A. Berger.26 Schwar-
zer's piece is succinct and hopeful. He reviews the procedural and
evidentiary rules that a judge may invoke to identify and narrow the
scientific issues in a case, and suggests ways in which the reference
guides can be used in this framing process.27 While his review of the
rules is accurate and helpful, his comments about the utility of the
reference guides seem to rest on the dubious assumption that the
average trial judge wil be able to wade into the coverage of a
particular technical topic and emerge with a workable understanding
of the critical operating principles."
Berger's review of the law pertaining to scientific
evidence-particularly Daubert-provoked a vigorous prepublication
attack by the organized plaintiffs' bar. During the Manual's
preparation, the Center sent copies of each chapter to reviewers with
expertise in the relevant field.29 Barry Nace, past president of the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the country's most
prominent plaintiffs' lawyers' group, attacked Berger's chapter in a fif-
21. MANUAL, supra note 11, at 7-117.
22. Id at 119-523.
23. Id. at 525-622.
24. See infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
25. William W. Schwarzer, Management of Expert Evidence, in MANUAL, supra note
11, at 7-35.
26. Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framewotk, in MANUAL, supra note 11, at 37-117.
27. Schwarzer, supra note 25, at 17-19.
28. For example, his discussion of how the Manual might be used to simplify a dispute
over DNA evidence, id at 18, seems to assume a vast amount of technical competence on
the judge's part.
29. MANUAL, supra note 11, at 623.
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ty-seven-page letter to Chief Justice Rehnquist. ° Nace called the
Manual " 'poorly conceived, researched and organized-and so
demonstrably wrong in so many places-as to be beyond repair.' "31
He accused Berger of taking " 'a very unfair, twisted and defense-
oriented view of Daubert.' 32 Nace and other critics argued that
Berger had materially overstated the discretion that Daubert gives
trial judges to exclude scientific evidence.3 Daubert clearly instructs
trial judges to assess the reliability of an expert's methods before
admitting scientific evidence.34 But, the critics argued, Berger
treated Daubert as inviting judges to exclude evidence on the
independent ground that the expert's conclusions were contrary to
generally held scientific positions and thus unreliable.35
As this Essay will demonstrate, Daubert leaves unanswered a
number of questions, including the relationship between Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, which focuses on the reliability of the expert's
methods, and Rule 703, which deals with the acceptability of the
expert's sources. 36  There is also a legitimate question whether
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which invites courts to balance the
probative value of any evidence against the potential for prejudice,
gives trial judges what is effectively a blank check in the scientific
evidence context.3 7 In the published version of her chapter, Berger
does nothing more than note these questions and fairly summarize the
arguments on all sides.38 Nonetheless, leaders of the plaintiffs' bar
have persisted in their criticism. Arthur Bryant, Executive Director
of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, for example, accused the Center
of " 'completely ignor[ing]' " earlier criticisms and characterized
Berger's chapter as " 'a very defense-oriented and improper view of
Daubert.' "' Such comments bear little relation to what Berger
actually says. Indeed, so intemperate and disproportionate are these
30. Mark Curriden, Plaintiffs' Lawyers Rap Evidence Manual, A.B.A. J. 20,21 (Mar.
1995). Nace represented the Daubert plaintiffs in the trial court.
31. Id. (quoting unpublished Nace letters).
32. Ld. at 20.
33. Id. at 21-22 (quoting criticisms by Nace and Trial Lawyers for Public Justice
Executive Director Author Bryant, as well as response of Federal Judicial Center staff
coordinator Joe S. Cecil).
34. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-97.
35. Curriden, supra note 30, at 22.
36. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
37. See infra note 119.
38. See Berger, supra note 26, at 103-17.
39. Curriden, supra note 30, at 22 (quoting Bryant); see also James L. Dam, Scientific
Evidence Explained, LAW. WKLY. USA, Dec. 19, 1994, at 1, 14 (reviewing same debate).
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criticisms that we suspect that the very idea of motivating trial judges
to look more critically at scientific evidence is what offends Nace,
Bryant, and their constituents.
The seven reference guides deal with the topics of epidemiology,
toxicology, survey research, DNA evidence, general statistics, multiple
regression analysis, and the estimation of economic losses, in that
order. The choice of topics is reasonable. Although some have
commented on the absence of computer science,40 the rationale for
excluding this topic seems to have been that it arises most commonly
in intellectual property cases, which are usually dealt with by the
patent specialists of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.4' While one could readily counter with a litany of
copyright and trade secret cases in which "secular" judges have
staggered through complex computer science issues,4 2 no single
volume can deal with everything, and no one can contend that the
subjects selected are not both important and difficult.
The order of presentation is hard to understand, however. The
chapter on basic statistical theory by David H. Kaye and David A.
Freedman43 covers statistical concepts such as sampling and sig-
nificance testing that underlie each of the reference guides. The
statistics chapter is thus introductory to all of the others, and it should
be read first by any user of the Manual who is not already conversant
with statistical theory. For this reason alone, the Kaye and Freedman
chapter, not the epidemiology chapter, should have come first.
Putting the general statistics chapter first would also have helped
to solve a related problem: insufficient emphasis on the intellectual
continuity among the various reference guides. Subject to the caveat
expressed in the preceding paragraph, each of the guides is self-
sufficient and can, as a practical matter, be read in isolation. On one
level, this is a virtue, since one could hardly expect judges to read the
entire 400-plus pages the first time that they deal with any single
topic. However, this self-sufficiency may mask the deeper truth that
the guides consist in large part of variations on a relatively limited
number of major themes. Having grasped, for example, the major
40. See Junda Woo, New Guide for Judges Tries to Clarify Scientific Issues, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 14, 1994, at B1.
41. See id.
42. For sheer complexity, it may be hard to top the numerous opinions in the
protracted Lotus-Borland software copyright litigation, culminating in Lotus Dev. Corp.
v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.) cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
43. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in MANUAL,
supra note 11, at 331-414.
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points of the basic statistics chapter, the reader is already equipped to
deal with most of the issues in the epidemiology and survey chapters,
as well as some of the most important questions that arise in relation
to toxicology, DNA profiling, and the estimation of economic loss.
To be fair, the connections among the chapters are noted from time
to time; there are, for instance, numerous cross-references." What
is lacking is an emphatic and repeated statement that science is not a
conglomeration of discrete "studies" but rather a coherent approach
to analyzing the world. As discussed in Part IIl of this essay, Daubert
all but requires this understanding of science; as argued in Parts IV
and V, this is also the approach most likely to enhance the quality of
the trial courts' day-to-day processing of scientific evidence.
The Manual concludes with a chapter on "Court-Appointed
Experts" by Joe S. Cecil and Thomas E. Willging, both members of
the Center's research staff,45 and a chapter on "Special Masters" by
Professor Margaret G. Farrell.46 The court-appointed expert chapter
contains a comprehensive review of the important legal and practical
considerations and the results of a survey of the entire federal district
court bench concerning the frequency and desirability of appointing
experts. Two aspects of the survey results stand out. First, judges
rarely appoint their own experts (eighty percent of the survey
respondents never had appointed an expert), 7 but they find them
very helpful when they do.48 Second, the trial judges almost never
appoint an expert who functions as a confidential advisor to the court
rather than as a conventional expert witness.' 9 If Daubert indeed
requires trial judges to make more informed judgments about
scientific evidence, then court-appointed expert witnesses and advisors
are likely to become more prominent players in the judicial process.
Farrell's chapter on special masters is a useful mix of legal
doctrine and practical commentary. Farrell is truly comprehensive,
44. See, eg., id. at 367 n.108 (noting cross-reference from statistics to regression
chapter); id. at 479 nn.3-4 (providing cross-references from economic loss chapter to,
respectively, multiple regression and survey chapters). However, despite the fundamental
status of the statistics guide, it is disappointing that its 187 citation-laden footnotes contain
only a handful of cross-references to the other guides.
45. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts, in MANUAL, supra
note 11, at 525-73.
46. Margaret G. Farrell, Special Masters, in MANUAL, supra note 11, at 575-622.
47. Cecil & Willging, supra note 45, at 535.
48. Id. at 537.
49. Id. at 534. Cecil and Willging contend that while the authority to appoint such an
advisor does not derive explicitly from Rule 706, a court's inherent power to do so is
"virtually undisputed." Id.
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dealing with everything from the historical roots of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 530 to the details of how much and by whom a
master should be paid."' Her overriding message is, appropriately
enough, that special masters should be reserved only for the most
extraordinary circumstances, and that the mere presence of complex
scientific issues is not enough to justify this exotic departure from
ordinary practice s
II. THE DAUBERT DECISION
A. The Holding
The essential holding of Daubertis that Federal Rule of Evidence
702, which establishes the standard for the admissibility of scientific
evidence, supersedes rather than incorporates the Frye test." The
Frye test, propounded in 1923, required that an expert's methods be
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community: "[T]he thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs."' 4 Rule 702, by contrast, permits "a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education" to offer
an opinion "if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue."55 Frye was followed almost universally by the federal
courts prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975.56 Since that time its continuing applicability has been a subject
of debate among both courts5 7 and commentators.
58
The factual issue in Daubert was whether the anti-nausea drug
Bendectin causes birth defects, as the plaintiffs claimed.59 In the
district court, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the
basis of expert testimony "that no epidemiological study ever
50. Farrell, supra note 46, at 579.
51. Id at 611-14.
52. Id. at 621-22.
53. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793 (1993).
54. Id. (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
55. FED. R. EvlD. 702.
56. See David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door,
Please: Exploring the Pas4 Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of
Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1808 (1994).
57. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792-93, 2793 n.3.
58. See id. at 2793 n.4 (listing many of the participants in the debate and noting the
coinage of the term "Frye-ologist" to describe them).
59. Id. at 2791.
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performed has concluded that the use of Bendectin by pregnant
women has a statistically significant association to birth defects in
these women's children."'6 The plaintiffs countered with affidavits
from eight experts with "impressive credentials" who concluded "that
Bendectin can cause birth defects."61 Their conclusion was based on
"in vitro" (test tube) and "in vivo" (live) animal studies that
found a link between Bendectin and malformations; phar-
macological studies of the chemical structure of Bendectin
that purported to show similarities between the structure of
the drug and that of other substances known to cause birth
defects; and the "reanalysis" of previously published
epidemiological (human statistical) studies.6"
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that "expert opinion which is not based on
epidemiological evidence is not admissible to establish causation"
because it cannot be characterized as meeting the Frye standard of
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.63 The
plaintiffs' experts' recalculations of data in previously published
studies that had found no causal link between the drug and birth
defects did not meet the general acceptance standard, in part because
they had not been published or subjected to peer review.6' The
Ninth Circuit affirmed.65
In considering whether Rule 702 had superseded the Frye test,
the Supreme Court looked first to the text of Rule 702 and its
drafting history. It found the absence of any reference to Frye or a
"general acceptance" standard to be persuasive.66 Moreover, the
Court emphasized, the Frye test was at odds with the "liberal thrust"
and "permissive backdrop" of the rules.
67
To replace the mechanical Frye test, the Court found in the text
of Rule 702 a two-part obligation: "[T]he trial judge must ensure that
any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
60. 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (granting summary judgment), affd, 951
F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), on remand, 43
F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
61. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791 (emphasis added).
62. a at 2791-92.
63. 727 F. Supp. at 575. Contrary to the Supreme Court's approach, the district
grounded its general acceptance test not in Rule 702, but in Rule 703. See id, at 572; infra
notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
64. 727 F. Supp. at 575-76.
65. 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
66. 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
67. Id.
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relevant, but reliable."68 The reliability requirement emerges from
Rule 702's reference to "scientific ... knowledge": "The adjective
'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of
science. Similarly, the word 'knowledge' connotes more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation., 69  The relevance
criterion derives from the Rule's requirement that the scientific
testimony will "assist the trier of fact" in order to be admissible."
The Court devoted most of its attention to the standards for
assessing reliability. Initially, it defined science in epistemological
terms. That is, " 'science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge
about the universe' " but rather " 'a process for proposing and
refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to
further testing and refinement.' ,71 In sum, "in order to qualify as
'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by
the scientific method."72
Before admitting scientific evidence, trial judges must therefore
make a preliminary assessment of whether the proffered testimony is
scientifically valid, in the sense of being the product of the scientific
method.73  (Trial judges will no doubt be heartened that the
Supreme Court is "confident that federal judges possess the capacity
to undertake this review.")74 In so doing, they are directed to
consider at least four factors.
The first question to ask in deciding whether a theory or
technique is scientific and thus reliable is "whether it can be (and has
been) tested."'75 Quoting without elaboration from Karl Popper and
other philosophers of science, the Court enjoined the trial bench to
seek such hallmarks of science as " 'falsifiability, or refutability, or
testability.' "76
A second factor is whether the work relied on has been subjected
to the peer-review publication process. The presence of
peer-reviewed publication should be viewed as a positive, "in part
68. Id at 2795.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Brief for American Association for the Advancement of Science and
the National Academy of Sciences as amici curiae at 7-8, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2796.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. ld. at 2797 (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE
GROWTH OF SciENTiFIc KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
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because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected."77 The lack of publication should not
be viewed as fatal, however; some good work may be too new, too
narrow, or too innovative to have survived the peer-review process."
(And some may even be done by law professors, who normally
publish in student-edited journals.)
Third, "the court ordinarily should consider the known or
potential rate of error ... and the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation."79  This cryptic
directive is accompanied by nothing more than two case citations."
The Court gave no further clue to what it had in mind in broaching
this complex and multifaceted topic. When dealing, for example, with
an established laboratory procedure, it may be possible to estimate
the "rate of error" fairly directly, by comparing the handling of
control samples to that of experimental samples.8' By contrast, in an
epidemiological study of a possible relationship between an environ-
mental hazard and a disease, "rate of error" might refer to the
statistical probability that the observed relationship could occur as a
matter of chance."
Finally, Frye reappears, if only through the back door. Although
not required, "widespread acceptance can be an important factor in
ruling particular evidence admissible";83 conversely, the lack of peer
support for a particular technique "may properly be viewed with
skepticism. ' 4 Presumably, general acceptance will be proved as it




80. The Court cites United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1989)
(surveying studies of the error rate of spectrographic voice identification technique) and
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting professional
organization's standard governing spectrographic analysis), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117
(1979).
81. See, e.g., Judith A. McKenna, Joe S. Cecil & Pamela Coukos, Reference Guide on
Forensic DNA Evidence, in MANUAL, supra note 11, at 273, 292-93 (discussing DNA
laboratory error rates).
82. See, eg., Linda A. Bailey et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in MANUAL,
supra note 11, at 121, 151-56 (discussing possible attribution of results of epidemiological
study to "random error"); cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,
1317 n.4 (observing difficulty of determining "rate of error" of plaintiffs' experts'
reassessment of prior research). See generally Developments, supra note 10, at 1545-46
(reviewing cases dealing with rates of error).
83. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
84. Il
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set standards for using the method, published references to its
successful use, and admissibility of similar testimony in other cases.8 5
The relevancy branch of the Rule 702 inquiry is more straightfor-
ward. The scientific evidence, even if reliable, must "fit" in the sense
of providing helpful information on a fact in issue.86 The Court
noted that a scientifically valid study of the phases of the moon might
be relevant to the factual question of whether a certain night was
dark. That same valid study would have no relevance, however, if the
disputed question was whether a particular individual was likely to
have behaved irrationally on a particular night.'
In the concluding paragraph of its Rule 702 discussion, the Court
made two highly significant points. First, it emphasized that the Rule
702 inquiry is "a flexible one" whose "overarching subject is the
scientific validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and
reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.""8
Second, trial courts are directed to focus "solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate."89 This
implies, as the organized plaintiffs' bar has argued, that as long as an
expert uses the scientific method, a trial court has no authority to
exclude his or her testimony, no matter how absurd the results may
seem. But as we shall see in the next section, and as Margaret Berger
has correctly observed in the Manual," this pronouncement is not as
absolute as it appears.
B. Unanswered Questions
1. How Will the Lower Courts Apply the Daubert Standard?
Daubert left a number of important questions unanswered. The
first is the practical one of how the lower courts are to apply such
indeterminate criteria as "falsiflability" and "rate of error."'" Given
its pervasive ambiguities, Daubert had the potential to skew trial court
results in either direction; scientific evidence might well have become
85. For a review of the various approaches to admissibility employed in cases decided
under Frye, see Developments, supra note 10, at 1494-97.
86. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-96.
87. Id. at 2796.
88. Id. at 2797.
89. Id.
90. Berger, supra note 26, at 104-06,113-17 (assessing propriety of using Rules 703 and
403 to exclude evidence that seems to satisfy Rule 702).
91. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
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significantly harder or easier to admit than under Frye.92 But a
preliminary sampling of decisions published in August 1994 suggested
that Daubert was having little impact on case outcomes. Its author,
Thomas J. Mack, argued that trial judges were simply reaching
pre-Daubert results and then dressing them up in post-Daubert
rationales.
93
Outcomes aside, it is difficult to determine at this point whether
the lower courts are doing more work, either qualitatively or
quantitatively, in response to Daubert. Two of the most widely cited
post-Daubert cases suggest opposite conclusions. In In re Paoli
Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, the Third Circuit implied that courts
that had already moved away from Frye in the direction of a more
discretionary reliability test could adapt to Daubert with little
difficulty.94 The Ninth Circuit's opinion on remand in Daubert itself
provides a striking contrast.' Judge Kozinski's discussion of the
Daubert standard drips with undisguised sarcasm. Under the heading
"Brave New World,"'96 he characterized the Daubert burden as
follows:
[T]hough we are largely untrained in science and certainly
no match for the witnesses whose testimony we are
reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those
experts' proposed testimony amounts to "scientific
knowledge," constitutes "good science," and was "derived by
the scientific method.,
97
Addressing the reliability question, the Ninth Circuit observed
that the Supreme Court's list of criteria was nonexclusive, and added
a new and "very significant" criterion of its own: whether the expert
testifies on the basis of research that was conducted independent of
the litigation.98 All of the Daubert plaintiffs' experts failed this test,
having developed their opinions for the purpose of testifying.9 9 If
92. See generally Berger, supra note 26, at 45-47 (assessing impact of Daubert).
93. Thomas J. Mack, Scientific Testimony After Daubert. Some Early Returns from
Lower Courts, TRIAL, Aug. 1994, at 23, 24.
94. 35 F.3d 717,742 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasizing consistency between Daubert and the
Third Circuit's earlier decision in United States v. Dowering, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985)).
95. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
96. Id. at 1315.
97. Id at 1316.
98. Id at 1317.
99. Id. Berger points out that under the Frye "general acceptance" standard, such
techniques as voiceprint analysis, handwriting analysis, and paraffin testing were readily
admitted even though they had been developed purely for forensic purposes and their
validity had never been established empirically. Berger, supra note 26, at 75-76. She
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this is to be a dispositive factor in the future, theif *outcomes will
change, and probably in a dramatic way. The exclusion of expert
testimony will tip the legal balance against those plaintiffs unfortunate
enough to be injured by something that has not already been the
subject of basic research.
The Ninth Circuit also engaged in an extended analysis of the
"fit" requirement, which the Supreme Court had disposed of in a
single paragraph. The Ninth Circuit expressed some qualms about
granting summary judgment through the simple expedient of rejecting
the plaintiff's expert affidavits on the newly articulated reliability
grounds: The plaintiffs had, after all, submitted those affidavits when
they reasonably believed that Frye was the law."° The court found
the answer to its dilemma in California tort law, which "requires
plaintiffs to show not merely that Bendectin increased the likelihood
of injury, but that it more likely than not caused their injuries.' 01
The best that could be said, however, for those plaintiffs' affidavits
that conceivably might have survived the reliability analysis was that
they tended to show " 'that Bendectin could possibly have caused
plaintiffs' injuries.' "" Thus, even if the plaintiffs' experts' methods
were deemed sufficiently reliable, their results were not relevant to
the issue specified by the controlling legal standard. Because the
plaintiffs bore the burden of proof on causation, the exclusion of their
expert evidence led inevitably to summary judgment against them. 3
questions whether comparable developments are likely under Daubert, "with its emphasis
on testing." Id at 75.
100. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1319-20.
101. Id at 1320.
102. Id at 1322 (quoting the district court opinion, 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal.
1989)).
103. Id The court suggested that epidemiological evidence can support a prima facie
case only if it demonstrates that the suspect substance can increase an exposed person's
relative risk of an associated disease by a factor of more than two. Relative risk is the
ratio of the incidence of the associated disease in the exposed population to its incidence
in the unexposed population. For example, a ratio of 10% to 5% would indicate a relative
risk of two. Id at 1320-21; see Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 168-69; infra notes 221-26
and accompanying text. According to the court, a relative risk greater than two is
equivalent to a legal showing of causation by a preponderance of the evidence. By
contrast, a relative risk of less than two, while possibly suggestive, "actually tends to
disprove legal causation, as it shows that Bendectin does not double the likelihood of birth
defects." Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1321 (footnote omitted).
The logic of the court's analysis is as follows: A relative risk of 1.0 means that the
suspect agent has no influence on the incidence of disease (the rates of incidence are the
same in the exposed and unexposed populations). A relative risk of 2.0 means that
incidence doubles with exposure. At a 2.0 level, the agent can be assumed to be
responsible for as many cases of the disease as all the background (non-exposure) causes
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On one level, the Ninth Circuit's analysis is perfectly straightfor-
ward. It found that the plaintiffs' studies, even if methodologically
reliable, simply did not "fit" the applicable legal standard. At best,
they were sound studies of the wrong question. On a deeper level,
however, the court's analysis raised what may be the most difficult
question left unresolved by Daubert: the extent to which a trial court
can evaluate an expert's conclusions in ruling on admissibility.
As noted above, the plaintiffs' bar has attacked the Manual for
even suggesting that a court might examine the conclusions of a study
in ruling on its admissibility. 4 However, how can a court evaluate
the "fit" between expert testimony and the issues in the case unless
it can examine the substance of that testimony? Looking at whether
an expert's work has been peer-reviewed or has a low rate of error
sheds little light on whether what the expert has to say will assist the
trier of fact in deciding a material issue. At a minimum, trial courts
need to be able to evaluate conclusions in the limited sense of
determining whether the expert's methods yield answers to questions
that are properly within the purview of the trier of fact. Whether the
court, when deciding on admissibility, is entitled to make a
preliminary value judgment about the soundness of those answers is
a much more controversial question.
Yet this is exactly what the Ninth Circuit did on remand in
Daubert, albeit by an indirect route. Recall that the Ninth Circuit
found that the plaintiffs' studies were irrelevant because they shed
light only on the question of whether Bendectin "could possibly have
caused plaintiffs' injuries," when the dispositive question was whether
Bendectin did cause those injuries."° Had the plaintiffs' studies
been addressed to the former, immaterial question, their exclusion on
relevancy grounds would have been noncontroversial. But they were
not, of course; their purpose was to show that Bendectin did cause the
plaintiffs' injuries.Y What the Ninth Circuit actually did was to
delve into the results of the studies and conclude that, on their
combined. Thus, a relative risk greater than 2.0 suggests that the suspect agent is
responsible for more than 50% of all cases of the disease; alternatively, it implies a 50%
likelihood that an exposed individual's disease was caused by the agent. See Bailey et al.,
supra note 82, at 168-69. Nonetheless, epidemiologists are careful to point out that "the
cause of an individual's disease.., is beyond the domain of the science of epidemiology."
Id at 167 (footnote omitted).
104. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
106. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1314 ("It is by such means that plaintiffs here seek to establish
that Bendectin is responsible for their injuries.").
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scientific merits, they could not support an opinion on the dispositive
legal question.1"7
There is nothing in the text of Daubert to justify the approach
that the Ninth Circuit took. Daubert says, rather, that in ruling on
admissibility under Rule 702, the trial judge should: (1) identify the
questions that the expert is raising, (2) decide whether the expert has
used reliable methods to study those questions, and (3) if so, decide
whether the questions are relevant to material issues in the case.108
There is no mandate for considering whether the experts' conclusions
are right or wrong, sound or unsound, when deciding on admissibility.
Contrary to the complaints of the plaintiffs' bar, nothing in Margaret
Berger's chapter in the Manual suggests otherwise.
2. What Is Left of Rule 703?
The Ninth Circuit's application of the Daubert standard on
remand, however misguided it may have been, does suggest a further
question: If it is inappropriate for a court to evaluate an expert's
conclusions when making an admissibility decision under Rule 702,
then when, if ever, can it do so? Obviously, the court must look at
the conclusions if it happens to be sitting as the trier of fact. It would
seem equally obvious that the court should do so in deciding whether
the expert's testimony is sufficient to withstand a motion for summary
judgment. The Supreme Court suggested in dictum at the end of the
Daubert opinion that there are likely to be cases in which the
plaintiff's expert testimony, while admissible, is not sufficient to defeat
a defense motion for summary judgment or a directed verdict.0 9
One might reasonably ask, however, how a trial court that had
already found the evidence both scientifically reliable and legally
relevant could then, without invading the province of the jury, find
the same evidence legally insufficient." With reliability and
relevance already determined, what grounds for criticism would be
left except credibility, which is always left to the trier of fact?
Although Berger notes that the "often blurred" distinction between
the admissibility and the sufficiency of scientific evidence "is clearly
107. See supra note 103. The court might plausibly have rejected the plaintiffs' studies
under the criterion of reliability because of their failure to deal adequately with relative
risk; instead, it addressed relative risk under the heading of fit. 43 F.3d at 1320-21.
108. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
109. i1 at 2798.
110. Cf. Developments, supra note 10, at 1550-51 (discussing cases seeking to preserve
the distinction between the admissibility and summary judgment standards).
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reaffirmed in Daubert," her discussion in the Manual offers no
assistance in resolving this logical dilemma."'
Berger is more forthcoming in discussing the backdoor route to
the consideration of expert conclusions that so troubled the plaintiffs'
bar-Rule 703.1 The Daubert Court mentioned Rule 703 only in
passing, observing that it "provides that expert opinions based on
otherwise inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if the facts or
data are 'of a type reasonably relied upon by the experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the sub-
ject.' ,113 As a practical matter, it might be argued, very little is left
of Rule 703: Does a finding of scientific validity under Rule 702 not
necessarily imply that the expert relied on sources that would be
deemed reasonable by those in the field?
Berger properly identifies, however, several theories that support
Rule 703's continued vitality. One possibility, Berger suggests,
drawing on a concurring opinion in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal
Corporation,"' is that Rule 703 supplements the Rule 702 reliability
inquiry, but only when the expert is relying on hearsay sources."5
Thus, as long as the expert is relying on admissible sources, the Rule
702 reliability test is wholly dispositive. But if some of the expert's
sources are hearsay, they must pass the further test of Rule 703's
"reasonably relied upon" standard." 6
Rule 703 may have a broader impact, however. According to the
majority opinion in Christophersen, as quoted by Berger, " 'district
judges may reject opinions founded on critical facts that are plainly
untrustworthy, principally because such an opinion cannot be helpful
to the jury.""17 Does this interpretation survive Daubert? Chris-
tophersen's term "trustworthy" seems to have been superseded by
111. Berger, supra note 26, at 52-53.
112. Rule 703, "Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts" states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
113. 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 703). The district court had relied on
Rule 703 as the basis for its general acceptance standard. See supra note 63.
114. 939 F.2d 1106,1118 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Clark, C.J., concurring), cert. dented,
112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
115. Berger, supra note 26, at 105-06.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1114).
1200 [Vol. 74
THE SCIENCE OF GATEKEEPING
Daubert's "reliability" analysis, while Daubert's construction of
helpfulness (that is, "fit") does not seem to invite an open-ended
inquiry into the expert's sources.
Berger (the plaintiffs' bar's institutional outcry notwithstanding)
does not pass judgment on these issues. She does, however, conclude
her discussion of Rule 703 by listing the following questions as asked
but unanswered by the Daubert opinion:
May a court rely on Rule 703 to exclude an expert's opinion
that reaches a conclusion that is inconsistent with a scientific
consensus or that lacks scientific foundation? Does such a
reading constitute a backdoor resurrection of the Frye
"general acceptance" test, which was rejected by the Court
as incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence? Should
a court use a sufficiency analysis rather than an admissibility
analysis when an expert uses appropriate methodology and
relies on data that experts reasonably rely upon but never-
theless reaches an opinion at odds with the scientific
community?"'
She is correct that these questions are at least latent in Daubert,
and there is no doubt that they are unanswered. Their very existence
will tempt trial court judges who are looking for a way to exclude
ostensibly reliable scientific evidence that they simply do not like."9
3. Is Daubert's Definition of Science Adequate?
As noted above, Daubert defines science in terms of its
methods."' Science, in the Court's view, is the process of
generating and testing hypotheses; those hypotheses must be
explicitly, if not quantitatively, falsifiable." While this definition
of science may strike the legal reader as noncontroversial, it is by no
means universally accepted in the contemporary academic community.
118. Id. at 111-12 (footnotes omitted).
119. The Ninth Circuit might well have relied on Rule 703 in its Daubert-remand
opinion. The plaintiffs' epidemiologists "reanalyzed studies done by other scientists," 43
F.3d at 1311 (9th Cir. 1995); thus, they relied on nominally hearsay sources in developing
their own opinions. The Ninth Circuit could have concluded that those underlying studies
were not of the sort reasonably relied on by experts in the field because they did not
reflect a relative risk greater than two.
Alternatively, a court might exclude a suspect study under Rule 403, which permits
the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence "if its probative volume is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798; see also Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) (excluding expert testimony on value of life under both Rule 703 and Rule 403).
120. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
121. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
1996] 1201
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The idea that science is a dispassionate search for the truth conducted
according to rigorously applied, value-neutral rules is usually called
"positivism."'" Most of the people whom the courts and the public
would identify as "scientists" are indeed positivists, and conduct their
research according to positivist ideals."
But many who practice what they believe to be science reject
positivism as unrealistic, undesirable, or both. So-called postmoder-
nists argue that, especially in the social sciences, it is impossible to
choose research topics, to set and apply criteria of validity, and
especially to evaluate the work of others without being influenced by
politics and ideology. 4  Since so much of science is inevitably
interpretive, they argue, we should own up to what we are doing and
abandon positivism as a deceptive myth."z
People who see themselves as inhabiting the real world may
dismiss this critique as merely another ephemeral academic
trend-what happens when smart people with huge egos have too
much time on their hands. But even if postmodernism is largely
written off as an ivory-tower reverie, there is a core point that cannot
be avoided: Many things that the law, the political system, and the
public routinely accept as "science" cannot fit within a rigorously
positivist definition of the sort propounded by the Daubert Court.
Consider that commonplace scientific miracle, the visit to the
doctor's office that results in the successful treatment of a disease. In
most instances, the physician's primary tool will be differential
diagnosis." This involves identifying the range of possible causes
of the patient's condition, comparing and contrasting their respective
symptoms, and then examining and testing the patient in an effort to
rule out all but the most likely diagnosis. 27 Is this science? An
immediate reaction is, Of course it is. Medical doctors have years of
scientific training, and they agree that this is the right way to proceed.
122. See John M. Conley, The Social Science of Ideology and the Ideology of Social
Science, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1249, 1250, 1254-55 (1994).
123. See Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15
CARDOZO L. REv. 2183, 2189-93 (1994).
124. See Conley, supra note 122, at 1250-51; JOHN K. SMITH, AFTER THE DEMIsE OF
EMPIRICISM: THE PROBLEM OF JUDGING SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL INQUIRY 9-10
(1993). For a readable general introduction to postmodernism, see ERNEST GELLNER,
POSTMODERNISM, REASON AND RELIGION (1992).
125. See Conley, supra note 122, at 1251-52.
126. See Ellen Relkin, Some Implications of Daubert and Its Potential for Misuse:
Misapplication to Environmental Tort Cases and Abuse of Rule 706(a) Court-Appointed
Experts, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2258-59 (1994).
127. See id, at 2258 n.12.
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Moreover, even a cursory glance at the last hundred years of medical
history indicates that differential diagnosis works astonishingly well.
But is differential diagnosis science in the narrower, positivist
sense specified by Daubert?" Can one test the judgment of a
physician in sorting out unquantifiable probabilities? How would one
calculate the rate of error for a large sample of differential diagnoses
when each one is rendered in a unique context? Yet the Supreme
Court could not have meant to exclude medical testimony based on
differential diagnosis.129
To take one more example, what about evolutionary biology?
The Supreme Court thinks that this is science, at least when
contrasted with creationism. Darwin's hypothesis of natural
selection cannot be tested, except against the remote evidence of the
fossil record. No one has ever seen natural selection at work at the
level of individual organisms. Moreover, from a present sensory
perspective, the whole concept is absurd. What would have induced
fish to grow limbs that would ultimately help them walk on land,
when at the time they grew the appendages they were much less
efficient than fins for moving through water?' 3' One could readily
conclude that creationism provides a more parsimonious explanation
for these complexities.
Despite these ironies, however, most of us-including those of us
who are judges-readily accept differential diagnosis and evolutionary
biology as "science" in every sense of the word. We do so not
because they satisfy a positivist checklist, but because common sense
tells us that they are trustworthy explanations of natural phenomena.
In the medical example, we observe that large numbers of people go
to the doctor and, after being subjected to differential diagnosis, get
better. In the case of evolutionary biology, either we defer to the
authority of the experts or, unless impelled in other directions by
religious conviction, think about the problem for a while and conclude
that natural selection really is the best available explanation of why
128. See id at 2259.
129. Cf. Carroll v. Litton Sys., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 2015, at *6-7 & n.6 (4th Cir. Feb.
1, 1995) (distinguishing, in toxic tort case, between admissible testimony of physicians that
plaintiffs' ailments were consistent with diagnosis of exposure to suspect agent, and
inadmissible testimony of same physicians that was based on unsubstantiated theory of
"environmental half-life" of agent).
130. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating Louisiana law requiring
school teachers who teach evolutionary theory to discuss creationism also).
131. For a clever biological resolution of this particular conundrum, see Carl Zimmer,
Coming Onto the Land, DISCOVER, June 1995, at 118.
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Velociraptor (the villain of Jurassic Park) had that nasty middle
finger.
In the wake of Daubert, the pertinent question is how the
Supreme Court intended the lower courts to deal with evidence that
meets the everyday, common-sense criteria for science but falls
outside the strict positivist definition. One clue may lie in a footnote
in which the Court observed that, although Rule 702 applies not only
to science but also to " 'technical or other specialized
knowledge,' ,,12 the holding of the case was limited to "scientific"
evidence.133 Thus, the answer may be that any expert evidence
which lies outside the bounds of positivist science is to be evaluated
under the pre-Daubert standards for nonscientific expert testimony,
which one leading commentator has characterized as "laissez-
faire., '34
This interpretation would lead to perverse results, however.
Arguably scientific research that seemed likely to fail the Daubert test
could then be repackaged as mere "technical or other specialized
knowledge" and admitted under the more lenient non-science
standard. A more plausible, if textually unsupportable, interpretation
is that the Court intended Daubert to be the exclusive standard for
anything that one might reasonably characterize as science. Under
this view, the "technical or other specialized knowledge" category was
intended not for bad science or almost-science, but for other kinds of
expert testimony, such as the valuation opinions of appraisers.
135
Although the latter view is our preferred solution, it leaves no
safe harbor for evidence that is widely viewed as scientific, is accepted
as sound, but cannot meet the Daubert criteria. This appears to be a
dilemma that the lower courts will have to resolve on their own,
without help from either the text of Daubert or the Manual.
36
132. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 n.8 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
133. Id.
134. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert. Developing A Similarly
Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony,
15 CAR3ozo L. REv. 2271, 2280 (1994).
135. For example, in Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1995), the
court rejected the testimony of an expert who valued a life by means of a "willingness-to-
pay" approach under the Daubert criteria for scientific reliability. By contrast, another
recent case held that a quasi-scientific opinion concerning metal fatigue should be
evaluated under Rule 701's lay opinion standard; it found the testimony inadmissible on
the record before it. Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1204-05
(3d Cir. 1995).
136. Berger deals indirectly with this issue in her discussion of Daubert's application to
the social sciences. See Berger, supra note 26, at 84-87 (reviewing debate between David
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III. WHAT Do JUDGES NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SCIENCE?
Whatever its ambiguities, Daubert does make one thing clear.
For judges, the scientific method must become the intellectual
equivalent of pornography: They must be able to know it when they
see it.'37 Daubert does not require, however, that judges be familiar
with the substance of any particular branch of science. On the
contrary, at least at the gatekeeping stage, Daubert all but forbids
comparing an expert's results to the accepted wisdom in the field. 8
Thus, Daubert's mandate is not to learn a little bit about many areas
of scientific investigation, but rather to learn a fair amount about
science itself
The authors have between them many years of experience
teaching science to judges.'39 We can state with a conviction borne
of that experience that judges, notwithstanding their general en-
thusiasm and diligence, tend to be highly resistant to the sort of
learning that Daubert demands. Time and time again, we have been
told that studying methodology is too abstract, mere theory; judges
are practical people who want to get down to concrete examples and
talk about whether particular "studies" should be admitted into
evidence."4 On our more sanguine days, we try to believe that the
judges are telling us that they are willing to learn methodology, but
want to do so in an inductive way. But they are not: Our nearly
McCord and David L. Faigman over proper evidentiary treatment of "soft" sciences).
137. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
138. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993)
("The focus of course must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions they generate.").
139. One of the authors (Conley) teaches the social science component of the
University of Virginia's Graduate (LL.M.) Program for Judges and is faculty director for
Duke Law School's annual Judging Science summer program. The other (Peterson)
lectures on statistics at the Duke program and has testified in numerous cases as an expert
in the fields of statistics and computer science. Both authors frequently lecture on
statistics to continuing judicial education audiences.
140. The ongoing work of John Monahan and Laurens Walker is the most significant
attempt to impose some theoretical coherence on the admissibility of individual studies.
Their proposal, in oversimplified terms, is that in some circumstances, courts might elevate
particular social science studies to the level of precedent, which would permit future courts
to cite and rely on them as they do cases. See, e.g., Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1988). They
endeavor to reconcile their theory with the Daubert standards in John Monahan &
Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research After Daubert, 2 SHEPARD'S
EXPERT & SCI. EVIDENCE Q. 327 (1994).
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uniform experience with hundreds of judges at every level is that they
think methodology is something for academics to worry about.
This zeal for getting to the evidentiary bottom line-a kind of
judicial Occam's razor-works in tandem with other problems to
make judges a uniquely difficult audience for science education. First,
because science aptitude plays no part in judicial selection, judges
range from closet Einsteins to proud Luddites.' 41 Moreover, judges
are rarely told that their ways of doing things are wrong (except,
occasionally, by their appellate supervisors). Instead, lawyers and
witnesses feel compelled to adapt to the judges' idiosyncracies; what
the judge is not interested in becomes unimportant. This state of
affairs makes it extremely difficult to persuade judges to put aside the
modes of analysis with which they are comfortable and to approach
problems from new and sometimes forbidding perspectives. And
finally, we teachers lack any effective "stick": No judge has ever been
impeached for failing a statistics course.
The result of all this, in our experience, is that judicial education
is often counterproductive. Instead of a few principles of general
applicability, what judges take away from courses, seminars, and
handbooks are fragments of information about particular kinds of
cases. Having mastered a few details of, say, a toxic tort case, a judge
will be tempted to transfer that learning to every case involving
epidemiological proof But unless the judge understands the
principles that underlie the details, the result can be the misap-
plication of rules that had no bearing on the situation in the first
place.
Two contrasting examples will illustrate the problem: the Fourth
Circuit's unsuccessful foray into statistical analysis in Bazemore v.
Friday,42 and District Judge Jack B. Weinstein's admirable scientific
work in the enormously complex Agent Orange litigation. 43 In the
Bazemore case, the plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination against
black employees of the North Carolina Agriculture Extension Service.
Numerous practices of the employer were challenged, and after
digesting a large amount of statistical evidence, the trial court ruled
141. The remainder of this section provides contrasting examples of judicial scientific
aptitude. For a critical review of various courts' efforts to apply basic scientific principles,
see Developments, supra note 10, at 1536-46.
142. 751 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1984), affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 478 U.S.
385 (1986) (per curiam), on remand, 848 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1988).
143. There are numerous opinions in this case. The best illustration of Judge
Weinstein's scientific dexterity may be In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
381, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
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for the defendants on all counts.'" On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed. 45 Rather than simply adopting the district court's find-
ings, however, the court of appeals undertook its own statistical
analysis of the extent to which the performance ratings awarded to
black employees were similar to those given to white emp10yees. 41
The requisite data were already in the record, and the plaintiffs had
somehow failed to analyze them as pa;rt of their case in chief at trial.
Understandably, the Fourth Circuit was curious about the issue.
On its own initiative, the court compared the proportion of black
employees receiving any of the top three of four rating levels with the
proportion of white employees receiving such ratings, and concluded
that the two proportions were not significantly different. 47 It
repeated the analysis for each of the six geographic districts into
which the Extension Service is organized, and found that for no
district were the racial proportions substantially different."
However, these analyses contain three significant errors that, in
combination, led the court materially astray.
First, built into the court's analysis is the presumption that since
there were four levels in the rating system, 25% of all employees
would be found at each level. That this presumption is false is
obvious from the data themselves: In fact, only 20.1% of employees
fell into the lowest category. 49 The court's erroneous presumption
caused it to understate the extent of the underrepresentation of black
employees at the upper three levels. Second, while it was important
to examine each of the six districts in turn for evidence of disparity,
the court failed to consider the cumulative effect of the disparities
across all districts.' Thus, while no single district may have
exhibited a significant racial disparity, the fact that most or all of
them showed at least some disparity to the disadvantage of black
employees was significant. 5' And finally, by not examining the
144. 478 U.S. at 386.
145. Id.
146. 751 F.2d at 672-74.
147. Id. at 673.
148. Id at 673-74.
149. See id. at 673 (providing raw data).
150. See id.
151. For a discussion of statistical significance, see infra note 159. The point here is the
simple one that a series of seemingly minor discrepancies can produce a compelling
pattern. Five coin flips may not reveal that a coin is weighted, but 500 probably will. In
the instant case, a rank sum analysis of the racial pattern of performance ratings within
each of the five districts having both black and non-black employees revealed imbalances
of 1.69, 1.10, 2.25, 2.48 and 0.85 standard deviations, all to the disadvantage of black
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breakdown by race within each of the top three rating levels (even
though this degree of detail was exhibited in its tables)," the court
failed to notice that white employees were consistently rated more
highly than black employees. The overall effect of these miscues was
to make a racial disparity well in excess of three standard deviations
appear to the court to be only about one standard deviation.'53 The
court thus converted statistics that actually favored the plaintiffs into
dispositive defense evidence. 4
Perhaps these errors occurred because the only statistical
formulas the court (and its clerks) knew were those for comparing
two proportions, and it simply did the best it could in applying that
knowledge. Had the court possessed a surer grasp of the principles
of statistical inference, it would have realized that somehow they
could be applied to the comparison by race of the entire pattern of
performance ratings. Then, even if it did not itself know the
appropriate formulas, the court could have sought professional help
from the parties or an expert appointed by the trial court.
Contrast the work of the Fourth Circuit in Bazemore with that of
Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation. In one of his
numerous opinions in the case, Judge Weinstein dealt with the claims
of plaintiffs who had opted out of the Agent Orange class actions.155
employees. The overall cumulation of these imbalances comes to 3.76 standard deviations,
larger than any one of the five individual imbalances, and well in excess of all commonly
used thresholds for defining statistical significance. For a discussion of standard deviation,
see infra note 153.
152. Bazemore, 751 F.2d at 673 (reproducing court's tables, formulas, and calculations).
153. "The standard deviation can be thought of as a measure of the typical or expected
variation of the numbers in a group from their average." BARNES & CONLEY, supra note
1, at 129. According to the Supreme Court, when the representation of a protected group
in a work force is more than two or three standard deviations below what might be
expected in the absence of discrimination, discrimination may be inferred, unless some
other explanation is offered. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,311
& n.17 (1977).
154. The court of appeals' misinterpretation of the performance ratings raised an ethical
dilemma for the defense experts on remand. Although the court of appeals' decision was
reversed in part by the Supreme Court, its findings regarding the fairness of the
performance rating system survived review. Should the defense remain silent and take
advantage of an erroneous statistical conclusion which was now the law of the case? See
Bazemore v. Friday, 848 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1988) (remanding to district court for further
proceedings following Supreme Court disposition). The case was settled before further
district court proceedings began. This and other issues in the case are discussed more fully
in WALTER B. CONNOLLY & DAVID W. PETERSON, THE USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION, app. F (1980 & Supp. 1995).
155. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 381, 611 F. Supp. 1223
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
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They, like the class plaintiffs, alleged that they suffered from various
health problems as a result of being exposed to the herbicide Agent
Orange while serving in the Vietnam war.5 6 In four succinct pages,
Judge Weinstein reviewed the then-current state of the relevant
epidemiological evidence, concluding that it would not support a
finding of a causal relationship between Agent Orange exposure and
the plaintiffs' health problems.5 7
In reviewing the available studies, Judge Weinstein's opinion
focused over and over again on just a couple of essential concepts.
First, he correctly defined the objective of the epidemiological
research as the detection of abnormally high incidences of health
problems among the population that had been exposed to Agent
Orange. 5 ' He recognized that an inference of causation might be
supported by evidence of statistically significant differences in disease
rates between otherwise comparable exposed and unexposed
populations . 5  Finding no basis in the available epidemiological
studies for an inference of causation and rejecting the plaintiffs' non-
epidemiological evidence, he entered summary judgment for the
defendants.'o
Reasonable minds might differ concerning some of the specifics
of Judge Weinstein's analysis. For example, did he put undue stress
on statistical significance as a Rubicon dividing reliable from
unreliable epidemiological studies?' 6' Should he have considered
the potential biasing effect of the government sponsorship of most of
156. 611 F. Supp. at 1228.
157. Id. at 1231-34.
158. Id. at 1231.
159. See id at 1231-34. A finding is said to be statistically significant if chance, acting
alone, probably would not have caused it. In many situations, the probability of the
chance occurrence of a relationship or difference (in this case, the difference between the
disease rates in the exposed and unexposed populations) of a particular magnitude can be
calculated and expressed in terms of a p-value. See BARNES & CONLEY, supra note 1, at
32-34. In many research contexts, a relationship or difference will be considered
statistically significant if p<.05; that is, if there is less than a one-in-twenty probability that
a comparable finding would have emerged as a matter of chance alone. In such a case,
the chance explanation (the null hypothesis) will be rejected, and other explanatory
hypotheses (for example, that Agent Orange exposure did cause a particular disease) may
be entertained. See id.
160. 611 F. Supp. at 1230-31, 1234, 1260, 1264.
161. See e.g., id. at 1233 (rejecting study of Australian veterans for failure to find
statistically significant increases in death rates following exposure). For a discussion of
over-reliance on statistical significance, see Developments, supra note 10, at 1544.
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the studies he cited? 162 Was he too quick to disregard the clinical
judgment of the plaintiffs' experts? 163
But irrespective of one's view on these questions, Judge
Weinstein's approach is exactly what Daubert demands. He did not
confound the adversary system or run the risk of scientific disaster by
introducing his own evidence or redoing the experts' analyses.
Rather, using transcendent principles of quantitative analysis, he
assessed a vast body of complex evidence in a succinct, coherent, and
clearly defensible manner. Although he framed his analysis in terms
of the pre-Daubert understanding of the expert testimony rules, it
could readily be recast under the Daubert headings of reliability and
fit. We turn next to an assessment of whether the Manual is likely to
assist judges in duplicating Judge Weinstein's accomplishment in other
contexts.
IV. DOES THE MANUAL Do ITS JOB?
We conclude this essay by evaluating the Manual's success in
achieving the objectives we identified in Part III: giving judges a
working familiarity with the scientific method and some of science's
most important operating principles. To do so, we examine four
reference guides that deal with two major topics. First, we consider
together the Reference Guide on Statistics by Kaye and Freedman and
that on Multiple Regression by Daniel L. Rubinfeld, and we then
discuss the reference guides on the closely related topics of
Epidemiology and Toxicology by, respectively, Linda A. Bailey, Leon
Gordis, and Michael Green; and Bernard D. Goldstein and Mary Sue
Henifin.
A. Statistics and Regression
Because statistical concepts underlie each of the other seven
reference guides, the Reference Guide on Statistics is the logical place
to collect those concepts for exposition and explanation. To a large
degree this is the chapter in which the essence of the methods applied
in all the others should reside. He who masters this chapter, one
would think, has grasped scientific fundamentals having wide
162. See 611 F. Supp. at 1232-34 (discussing studies sponsored by the United States and
Australian governments).
163. See id. at 1235-39. The scientific status of clinical diagnosis is discussed supra at
notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
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application; she who understands these materials should be able to
handle her responsibilities under Daubert.
The Reference Guide on Statistics opens with a discussion of the
breadth of the field of statistics,"6 and then poses and responds to
a series of questions concerning data collection, presentation, and
interpretation.'" There is an appendix providing technical details
on the standard error, normal curve, and p-value, 66 and also a
glossary containing explanations of technical terms.67
The question-and-answer format is engaging, and is a fresh
departure from the traditional axiomatic treatment of this material.
Such questions as "Are the measurements recorded correctly?"'"
and "Can the results be generalized?"'69 can be taken directly from
the paragraph subheadings and used in the courtroom. The question-
and-answer format extends over a wide range of topics, highlighting
many aspects of a statistical study that might make it unreliable.
What is more difficult to extract from the text and carry into the
courtroom are the truly fundamental ideas-the scientific es-
sence-that the post-Daubert court needs. It is one thing to ask the
right question, quite another to be able to evaluate its answer.
The most fundamental of these ideas may be the relationship
between a research design and the statistical properties of the
resulting data. Most quantitative research designs are based on one
of two ideals: the ideal of a designed or controlled experiment,70
and the ideal of a random sample.7 1 Inherent in each of the ideal
designs is a mechanism for the calculation of probabilities. These
probabilities, in turn, give definition to such terms as p-value,
164. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43, at 335-39.
165. I& at 341-87.
166. l at 389-93. Standard error is closely related to standard deviation, which is
discussed supra at note 153. The normal curve is the familiar bell curve. See Kaye &
Freedman, supra note 43, at 401. P-values are discussed supra at note 159.
167. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43, at 395-412.
168. Id. at 342-43.
169. Id. at 349-50.
170. "The true experiment is defined by the random assignment of subjects either to
an experimental (or treatment) group or to one or more comparison (or control) groups
that do not receive the treatment under investigation." JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS
WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 59 (2d ed. 1990); see Kaye & Freedman, supra note
43, at 397. Consider, for example, a test of a new drug among 500 patients; on the basis
of a coin flip or some comparably random procedure, 250 patients get the drug (the
experimental group), while the other 250 get a placebo (the control group).
171. A sample is a selected subset of a population; a random sample is one that is
drawn on the basis of chance (rolling dice, for example). See Bailey et al., supra note 82,
at 176 (epidemiology chapter).
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statistical significance, standard deviation, confidence interval, and
expected value.73 The further a research design strays from the
relevant ideal, the less practical meaning we can attach to any of
those terms.
Thus, a firm grasp of these two ideals is necessary for an
informed evaluation of almost every application discussed in the
Manual. On this critical point, however, the Reference Guide on
Statistics fails to deliver. True, we are told that "[c]ontrolled
experiments are, far and away, the best vehicle for establishing a
causal relationship,"'174 but never do we get to see why, and in
particular, never do we get to see how the p-value depends both on
the experimental design and its outcome. 5  While a detailed
example of a random sample is given in the appendix,'7 6 its elemen-
tal features are swamped by the plethora of possible outcomes,
causing the authors to retreat quickly to formulas, and leaving the
reader with little understanding of the link between a confidence
interval and the sampling circumstances that drive it. This is
especially disappointing, because one of the authors, David Freedman,
is the lead author of a text that provides an outstanding introduction
to each of these two fundamental ideals. 7
Aside from this strategic omission, there are some tactical
miscues in the Reference Guide on Statistics. The issue of confidence
intervals in relation to p-values is not well-treated. It is suggested
that there is some tension as to which is more appropriate or more
172. When a quantity in a population is being estimated on the basis of a sample drawn
from that population, the estimate is sometimes expressed as a range, called a confidence
interval. Suppose, for example, that we wished to estimate the average height for the
American adult male population on the basis of a random sample. Suppose that this
results in a 95% confidence interval of 69-75 inches. This means that we can be 95%
certain that the true population average lies within that range. See Kaye & Freedman,
supra note 43, at 396 (statistics chapter); Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 173 (epidemiology
chapter).
173. This is the average value that we would expect some particular quantity, or
variable, to have on the basis of chance alone. If the variable were "percentage of heads"
in a series of coin tosses, the expected value would be 50%. If over the course of 100
tosses the percentage were, say 20%, we would begin to suspect a loaded coin. We could
assess the statistical significance of this discrepancy between observed and expected values
by calculating a p-value: the probability that chance alone would result in a discrepancy
of such magnitude. See BARNES & CONLEY, supra note 1, at 26-27.
174. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43, at 347.
175. When the assumptions underlying the controlled experiment are violated, the p-
value's practical utility is diminished.
176. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43, at 389-91.
177. DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS -7, 252-81, 328-34 (2d ed. 1991).
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informative,"8  when in fact they are complementary. Where
possible, both should be computed because they provide different
information.'79 Elsewhere, the authors misstate an aspect of the
relationship between standard deviations and p-values.' °  The
glossary is useful for obtaining a rough sense of the meanings of the
terms listed there, but several of the definitions are fuzzy or in-
complete, and they are written in a style likely to intimidate the
novice.
181
The Reference Guide on Multiple Regression by Daniel Rubinfeld
may be thought of as an extension of the statistics reference guide, in
that regression is a particular type of statistical model."s  Once
again, the presentation is in question-and-answer format. The general
topics addressed deal with the identification of the question to be ad-
dressed,"s the choice of a statistical model,"s the practical sig-
178. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43, at 384 & n.164.
179. For example, suppose a 95% confidence interval on the gender coefficient in a
regression analysis extends from -$100 to +$900. To infer the exact p-value from this
information, one needs to know the number of degrees of freedom associated with the
regression and to have access either to a sophisticated calculator or else to an appropriate
probability table. Conversely, given the information that the gender coefficient estimate
of $400 in a regression has a p-value of 0.07, one cannot ascertain the 95% confidence
interval without knowledge of the number of degrees of freedom involved, and without
either a complex calculation or else an appropriate probability table. Much of the practical
appeal of the confidence interval is that it is expressed largely in natural units (in this case
dollars), likely to be familiar to triers of fact. The appeal of the p-value is that its
emphasis is on the weight to be given the evidence (of gender disparity in this example).
For a discussion of regression analysis, see infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
180. Id. at 380 n.145. Specifically, note 145 perpetuates the myth that a three-standard-
deviation disparity corresponds to a (two-tailed) p-value of about .01, when in fact the
p-value associated with such a disparity is .0027. Id. The authors state the proposition
correctly in the appendix. Id. at 391; see FREEDMAN ET AL., supra note 177, at A.86.
181. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43, at 395-412. The Fisher's Exact Test, for
example, is tied to the comparison of sample proportions, when instead it should be tied
to an experiment involving fixed marginal totals. Id at 399. The discussion of the p-value
presumes that only large positive values of the test statistic may be significant, when in
many experiments it is small or even large negative values that are significant. Id at 402.
The discussion of z- and t-statistics is turgid at best, and does not distinguish between the
two in the case of small samples. Id. at 410-12.
182. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference on Multiple Regression, in MANUAL, supra note 11,
at 415-69. "A regression model attempts to combine the values of certain variables (the
independent variables) to obtain expected values for another variable (the dependent
variable)." Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43, at 404-05 (statistics chapter). Thus, where
the issue is sex discrimination in salary at a defendant firm, a regression model might be
used to predict salary (the dependent variable) on the basis of such independent variables
as age, education, and seniority. If actual salaries for women fell substantially below
predicted salaries, the regression model might be probative evidence for the plaintiffs.
183. Rubinfeld, supra note 182, at 423.
184. Id. at 423-28.
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nificance of the regression results,"8 the robustness of the
results, 8 the qualifications of the expert,"s and the presentation
of regression evidence."s An appendix on the more mathematical
aspects of regression. 9 and a glossary of terms190 follow the main
body of the Guide.
Regression is a rich and broad topic, and Rubinfeld has touched
authoritatively on a remarkable number of issues within the confines
of his chapter. Indeed, so extensive is this coverage that almost any
issue that may arise in connection with a regression is at least
mentioned. Thus, aside from its value as a source of explanation of
regression concepts, the Guide can be used to confirm that an issue
raised in litigation about a regression may have a material rather than
incidental impact on its interpretation.
The Regression Guide makes no attempt to convey a sense of
how regression works; or of how a set of fact circumstances could ever
lead logically to a set of estimates for regression coefficients,191 or
to a forecast accompanied by a confidence interval."g However, it
would be almost impossible to supply such an understanding to a
reader who did not have a firm grasp on the connection between a
random sample and a confidence interval, and as already noted, such
a grasp is not likely to be gleaned from other parts of the Manual.
Thus, there is something of a gap in the discussion of regression, and
though Rubinfeld's treatment is coherent and wide-ranging, it does
not quite reach the foundation of the subject. Nevertheless, a careful
reading of this Guide gives one a good sense of the kinds of things
regression can do, and the kinds of things that may go wrong.
185. Id. at 429-32.
186. Id at 432-38.
187. Id at 439.
188. Id at 441-43.
189. Id. at 445-62.
190. Id at 463-68.
191. The regression coefficient "indicates the average change in the dependent variable
associated with a one unit change in [a particular] independent variable." BARNES &
CONLEY, supra note 1, at 408. Thus, in a regression model of salary, the regression
coefficient for the independent variable "experience" would tell us how large an increase
in salary was associated with the addition of one year's experience. See supra note 182.
192. In regression analysis, "the results can be used to predict a value of the dependent
variable [salary, for example] that will occur given knowledge of the values of all the
independent variables [age, education, and experience, for example]." BARNES &
CONLEY, supra note 1, at 449. This predicted value can be expressed as a range, or
confidence interval, within which it is likely to occur. See supra note 172.
193. See supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
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If there is a weakness to the Reference Guide on Regression, it
lies not so much within this Guide as in the absence of comparable
neighboring guides. The inclusion in the Manual of a chapter devoted
only to regression may suggest that it is the preferred framework for
analysis of problems involving two or more variables. In fact, there
are other approaches to the analysis of such problems,'94 and the
choice of an approach should always be dictated by the fact situation.
Regression imposes on a fact situation a framework to which that
situation may not conform. For a variety of reasons, that incom-
patibility may materially distort the regression results.9 While
regression is a fascinating and widely used method of analysis, its
importance as evidence in a particular legal proceeding must rest on
its fit to the circumstances at hand, not its general popularity. The
legal profession's tendency to appeal to case law authority for the use
of a particular formula or method of analysis must, in the interest of
better adjudication, give way to an appeal to a more general principle:
that a statistical analysis be crafted to fit the fact circumstances,
wherever that may lead. 6 Of two analyses, that which better fits
the fact circumstances is the more reliable and thus should be the
more credible, even though it may be based on more obscure
formulas or models."9 Once again, the post-Daubert court must be
alert to the possibility that good science may not lead to regression
194. One approach is based on forming cohorts of individuals or objects that are similar
with respect to certain qualities (such as education and experience), and then examining
the correlation within each cohort between other qualities, such as salary and gender. The
results of these individual examinations are then aggregated to produce an overall pattern
of association between, for example, gender and salary. This approach is sometimes called
cohort analysis, and the statistical tests it employs are variations on a Mantel-Haenszel test.
For a detailed description of cohort analysis and some of its variations, see CONNOLLY &
PETERSON, supra note 154, §§ 9.03[1], 9.03[2], and 9.03[3][b].
195. For a discussion of ways in which regression may rest on inapt assumptions, see
id. app. E.
196. The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the data in Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662 (4th
Cir. 1984), discussed supra at notes 144-54 and accompanying text, illustrates what can
happen when the statistical technique does not fit the facts. Had the case not settled, the
district court presumably would have been saddled with the wrong analysis as the law of
the case. Such problems of fit suggest a potential difficulty with Monahan and Walker's
proposal to give precedential value to some social science studies. See supra note 140.
197. There is no simple, objective rule for judging quality of fit to the facts. For
example, one cannot generally choose between two competing regression models based
solely on their R squares. (R square describes the proportion of the variation in the
dependent variable that is accounted for by all the independent variables included in a
regression model. Thus, a model of salary with an R square of .35 would be accounting
for 35% of the variation in salary, leaving the remaining variation unexplained. See
BARNES & CONLEY, supra note 1, at 443-44.).
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models, and so the court should not automatically presume that
regression, because it has been used in other cases, is the most
probative statistical framework.
B. Epidemiology and Toxicology
Each of these two guides begins with a concise definition of its
subject discipline. Bailey, Gordis, and Green define epidemiology as
"the field of public health that studies the incidence, distribution, and
etiology of disease in human populations"; 9 its purpose "is to
better understand disease causation and to prevent disease in groups
of individuals."' 99 Toxicology, according to Goldstein and Henifin,
is "the science of poisons," defined as " 'the study of the adverse
effects of chemical agents on biological systems.' 200
Early on, each guide establishes the relationship between its
subject discipline and the other. From the perspective of
epidemiology, toxicology is applicable once a relationship has been
observed between exposure to a suspect agent and an adverse human
health effect. Controlled animal studies by toxicologists "often
provide useful information about pathological mechanisms,, 20 1 while
in vitro or test-tube studies can assess the effect of a toxic substance
at the cell or tissue level, subject always to concerns about "whether
one can generalize the findings from the tissues in laboratories to
whole human beings."'
The Toxicology Guide states the complementarity of the two
disciplines in more forceful terms: "These sciences often go
hand-in-hand in assessing the risks of chemical exposure without
artificial distinctions being drawn between the two fields."2 3 It goes
on to observe and lament the fact that "while courts generally rule
epidemiological expert opinion admissible, admissibility of
toxicological expert opinion has been more controversial because of
uncertainties regarding extrapolation from animal and in vitro data to
humans."'  The Ninth Circuit's remand opinion in Daubert il-
198. Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 125.
199. ld.
200. Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifen, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in
MANUAL, supra note 11, at 185 (quoting Louis J. CASARETr & JOHN DOULL, CASARETr
AND DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 3 (Mary 0. Amdor et al.
eds., 4th ed. 1991)).
201. Bailey et al., supra note 82 at 130.
202. Id.
203. Goldstein & Henifen, supra note 200, at 194.
204. 1&
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lustrates the point: It separated the two disciplines, attributed too
much explanatory power to epidemiology, and too little to
toxicology."° Goldstein and Henifin note that for a variety of
reasons, including expense and ethical constraints, epidemiological
studies of suspected toxic agents are few and far between °5 The
existing toxicological database on the same compounds, while still
limited, is far larger, and new toxicological studies are cheaper and
easier to carry out.' In addition, epidemiological and toxicological
studies tend to be strikingly consistent.' Facts such as these
prompt the inference-never explicitly advanced by the authors-that
the courts should eschew their pejorative outlook on toxicology.
These introductory points, all well taken, ironically prompt our
single major criticism of the two chapters: They would better have
been written as a single guide on the broader topic of how scientists
study the causes of disease. In simple terms, the two chapters argue
convincingly that epidemiology and toxicology are two sides of the
same coin. Epidemiology suggests that something is going on and
toxicology shows how it could be happening. Courts, on the other
hand, have tended to treat epidemiology as "real science" while
dismissing toxicology as speculation. 9 By seemingly reaffirming the
"artificial" division between the fields, the Manual may be unwittingly
re-enforcing this bias.
This philosophical problem aside, each of the chapters is
individually effective, with a few notable exceptions. The
Epidemiology Guide begins with a useful introductory discussion of
causation versus association, general versus specific causation, and
sample size.210 It is, in our view, the most effective discussion of
these pervasive issues in the entire Manual. Fortunately, this is the
first chapter. Nonetheless, one wonders again why there is no
introductory chapter that deals with these and other overarching
concepts.
205. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,1314,1316-22 (9th
Cir. 1995). The court implied that while animal and chemical studies are largely irrelevant
to questions of specific, individual causation, epidemiological studies that meet certain
statistical criteria can make a prima facie case of causation. See supra notes 101-03 and
accompanying text. Epidemiology itself abjures the question of individual causation. See
Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 167.
206. Goldstein & Henifen, supra note 200, at 194.
207. Id at 194-95.
208. Id. at 195.
209. See supra note 205.
210. Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 125-28.
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The authors next lay out three questions that typically frame the
use of epidemiology in legal disputes:
1. Were the research methods trustworthy?
2. If so, is exposure to the agent associated with disease?
3. If the agent is associated with disease, is it a causal
relationship?
21 1
While these three questions indeed comprise a logical approach to the
evaluation of epidemiological evidence, the authors do not address the
question of how they square with the analysis required by Daubert.
For example, are all three questions relevant to admissibility as
defined by Daubert, or is the third directed at a study's conclusion,
and thus not a part of the Daubert admissibility analysis?2 12
At this point, the authors move into the details of their subject,
beginning with an excellent discussion of research design.213  This,
in our experience, is a very difficult topic for judges. They tend to
interpret prudent conventions (for example, the requirement that an
experiment test the effect of only one variable at a time) as flaws and
to place impossible demands on researchers. When asked, Socratical-
ly, to design a study of a particular topic, judges regularly propose the
impossible. Bailey, Gordis, and Green do as good a job as can be
done by setting out with clarity what different research methods can
and cannot accomplish.1 4
The succeeding discussion of sample selection and size issues is
not nearly as successful.215  It is too technical in style and
phrasing.1 6 The discussion of "power curves" is all too likely to
confirm the popular conception that sampling is voodoo.217 The
discussion fails to make the important point that one can often draw
meaningful conclusions from samples that may seem "small" from a
common-sense perspective. There is also no effective explanation of
how tests of statistical significance factor sample size into their
calculations: As a general proposition, the smaller the sample size,
211. IL at 128.
212. In its Daubert remand opinion, the Ninth Circuit dealt with all three under the
Rule 702 admissibility rubric. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
213. Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 129-38.
214. This is another of those recurrent issues whose successful treatment here argues
for an introductory chapter on the methods of science.
215. Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 138-43.
216. See, e.g., id at 140.41 (discussing calculation of appropriate sample sizes).
217. Id. at 14143. Power curves depict the probability that at a particular sample size
a researcher will be able to detect an increased risk of disease of a particular magnitude.
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the bigger the observed difference or relationship will have to be to
meet a given threshold of statistical significance.
There follows a brief but lucid treatment of data collection
problems.1 The critique of scientific evidence, whether by judges
or opposing experts, often jumps right to the level of results and
interpretation. But, as Bailey, Gordis, and Green convincingly argue,
the intelligent critic needs to look carefully at how the data to be
relied on were collected. Moreover, the pertinent questions are
largely matters of common sense that can be dealt with by
nonspecialist judges. 9
Next, under the heading of "Association Between Exposure and
the Disease,"'2 the authors take on the vitally important topics of
relative risk, odds ratio, and attributable risk. These are three related
measures of the extent to which exposure to a suspected toxic agent
increases a person's risk of a particular disease beyond the back-
ground level observed in the unexposed population. One or more of
these measures is discussed in almost every toxic tort case; indeed,
they are nearly talismanic." The discussion of relative risk is
superb-clearly written with simple but fully adequate examples.2'
The discussion of odds ratio is far less successful. The authors talk
around the question of what the odds ratio is, but jump directly into
the algebra without offering a clear prose definition.' The reaction
of many judicial readers is likely to be frustration. Attributable risk
(or APR, for attributable proportion of the risk) is described as
"[p]erhaps the most useful measurement of risk."'224 If so, why does
it come last, and in particular why does it come after a discussion of
odds ratio that is likely to have confused the reader? The prose
definition of APR does not connect well to the algebraic expression,
218. Id. at 143-46.
219. See, e.g., id. at 145 ("For example, a researcher may be interested in whether fetal
malformation is caused by a mother's exposure to virus during pregnancy .... Mothers
of the malformed infants may tend to recall inconsequential fevers or runny noses during
pregnancy that readily would be forgotten by a mother who had a normal infant.")
220. Id. at 147-56.
221. Once again, the Ninth Circuit's remand opinion in Daubert is illustrative. See
supra note 103; see also Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 168-69 (discussing relative risk
cases).
222. Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 147-49.
223. Id. at 149. The odds ratio compares the odds of having a disease when exposed
to the suspect agent to the odds of having the disease without exposure.
224. Id.
1996] 1219
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
although a graph near the end of the section may clarify the issue for
some readers.2
The discussion of the role that statistical significance and
confidence intervals play in interpreting epidemiological data is the
only truly disappointing part of the epidemiology Reference
Guide.' Unlike most of the rest of the chapter, this section is
unduly complex. There is no discussion of the mechanism that links
significance testing with research design.2' The important practical
question of the relationship, if any, between statistical significance and
the legal burden of proof is relegated to a lengthy textual footnote,
which is dense to the point of impenetrability.2" The fact that the
confidence interval is the product of a calculation is not adequately
explained. 9  This goes without saying among those with even
rudimentary statistical knowledge, but it is our observation that judges
and other statistical neophytes routinely treat confidence intervals as
if they were merely assumed. Moreover, here as in the Statistics
Guide, p-values and confidence intervals are treated as competing
alternatives, when in fact they are complementary means of assessing
whether an observed difference or relationship should be taken
seriously or written off to chance.2' °
The succeeding, critically important section on inferring causation
from association is, fortunately, particularly well done. 1  Bailey,
Gordis, and Green effectively present the concept of con-
founds-factors other than the suspected agent that may actually be
causing the disease under investigation." z  They give an equally
clear explanation of Koch's postulates, a set of long-accepted criteria
to guide researchers in deciding whether to infer causation from an
apparent association between the disease and the exposure of
interest."3
The final section in the Epidemiology Guide deals with the very
difficult question of the role that epidemiological evidence can play
225. Id. at 149-50. APR separates the proportion of the disease in the exposed
population that can be associated with the suspect agent from the proportion that must be
attributed to factors that affect both exposed and unexposed people.
226. Id. at 151-56.
227. For a discussion of this relationship, see supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
228. Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 153 n.80. Compare the discussion of this important
concept in Developments, supra note 10, at 1548-56.
229. Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 154-55.
230. Id. at 153-55; see supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
231. Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 157-66.
232. Id. at 158-60.
233. Id. at 161-64.
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in establishing individual causation.' This is, of course, the ul-
timate question in most cases involving epidemiological evidence.
The bottom line, the authors candidly admit, is that "the cause of an
individual's disease.... is beyond the domain of the science of
epidemiology." 5  Nonetheless, they contend, epidemiological
evidence alone can sometimes be sufficient to satisfy a plaintiff's
burden of proof in a toxic tort case. 6 Relating the epidemiological
concept of relative risk to the civil burden of proof, they explain why
"[a] relative risk greater than 2.0 would permit an inference that an
individual plaintiff's disease was more likely than not caused by the
implicated agent." 7  This relationship, the authors observe, has
been appropriately invoked in a number of cases; their brief but lucid
discussion should ensure that others get it right as well. 8
The Epidemiology Guide concludes with a glossary of terms."
Unlike its counterpart in the statistics chapter, this glossary is succinct
and clear. Whereas the statistics glossary looks like the compromise
work product of a committee of squabbling scientists, this one appears
to have been written with the reader in mind. Without sacrificing
accuracy, this glossary should enable judges to look things up and
come away informed rather than frustrated.
The Toxicology Guide is at once the shortest and the clearest
chapter in the entire Manual. Goldstein and Henifin begin with a
clear definition of toxicology and an excellent discussion of the
different kinds of research that toxicologists do.' They turn
immediately to the aspect of toxicology that has troubled courts most:
extrapolation.24 Specifically, can one properly extrapolate from
laboratory animals to humans, and from the very high doses of
suspected poisons that are typically administered in laboratory
research to the much lower doses that usually characterize human
exposures to the same agents in the real world? Their response is
both candid and coherent; appropriately, they stress that the most
234. L- at 167-70.
235. Id at 167.
236. Id. at 168-69. Their discussion properly deals with these issues under the heading
of evidentiary sufficiency, not admissibility, in contrast to the approach taken by the Ninth
Circuit in the Daubert remand, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d
1311, 1316-22 (9th Cir. 1995); see supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
237. Bailey et al., supra note 82, at 168-69.
238. Id. at 168-70.
239. Id. at 171-78.
240. Goldstein & Henifen, supra note 200, at 185-95.
241. Id. at 191-92.
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reliable results come about when epidemiology and toxicology work
in concert.242
Like their epidemiological colleagues, Goldstein and Henifin
must also deal with the question of when a toxicologist can conclude
that an agent caused a particular person's disease.243 The general
problem is the same as in epidemiology, although the criteria that
guide the judgment differ in their specifics.2' This Guide also
concludes with a straightforward glossary that should be useful even
to judges working with toxicological evidence for the first time.245
To summarize, the epidemiology and toxicology guides should
prove extremely useful. With the few exceptions noted, they offer
clear prose descriptions of the most difficult and important concepts
in the two fields. Their most significant contribution is to explain the
relationship between epidemiology and toxicology. Contrary to what
the Ninth Circuit seemed to believe in considering Daubert on
remand,' that relationship is complementary rather than hierar-
chical. Judges who read only the introductory pages of these two
guides should, at a minimum, be able to improve on the Ninth
Circuit's understanding.
C. Conclusion
In the Reference Guides on Statistics, Multiple Regression,
Epidemiology, and Toxicology, as in the Manual as a whole, much is
accomplished, but some significant opportunities are lost. Most of the
recurrent significant issues in forensic science are addressed. Despite
occasional errors and lapses into impenetrable jargon, the treatment
is usually accurate and coherent. Readers are given a comprehensive
overview of each of the included disciplines and, importantly, are
provided with templates for identifying common forms of misap-
plication and overreaching.
Our principal criticism of the Manual has less to do with what it
is than with what it fails to be. Judges and lawyers who encounter
particular topics in particular cases will be able to find useful and
generally authoritative references. What they may not get is a sense
242. Id at 192, 194-95.
243. Id. at 205-08.
244. Id. The toxicological criteria include the fact and manner of exposure to the toxic
compound, how the human metabolic system interacts with the compound, and the
temporal relationship between exposure and the onset of disease. It.
245. Id. at 213-17.
246. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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of the broader principles that unite the Manual's constituent
disciplines. Because the Manual lacks an interdisciplinary introduc-
tion to the scientific method, and because individual guides often fail
to make important connections among topics,.47 scientifically
inexperienced readers may be tempted to see science as a collection
of discrete problems and solutions rather than as a network of
interrelated concerns and approaches.
In response to this criticism, one might well ask, "So what?" If
the Manual is at least improving the odds that judges will find
accurate answers to individual questions, is it not then an unqualified
good thing?
The problem, as we see it, has two dimensions. First, whatever
the aspirations of its authors might have been, the Manual will
inevitably become Talmudic. Judges will use it and cite it, incor-
porating its preferences into the case law, and lawyers will strive to
tailor their scientific evidence to fit those preferences. Second, judges
are lawyers trained in the common law: When they find an authority
squarely on point, they follow it; when they do not, they analogize to
the closest alternative. This mode of reasoning has worked tolerably
well with cases for almost a thousand years, but it is often ill-suited
to science. What is "on point" in the common-sense world of the
common law is not necessarily what is on point in the scientific world;
likewise, what are analogous categories to the lawyer may be apples
and oranges to the scientist.
The danger, then, is that judges who learn a little bit about a
number of ostensibly isolated topics-but who fail to appreciate the
principles that tie those topics together-will try to extend their
knowledge in inappropriate ways. And because they are judges, such
extensions will become precedent. Should all this come to pass, the
Manual, in a consummate irony, will have succeeded in exacerbating
the very problem it was designed to correct.
We hope that we exaggerate the danger. The Manual began as
a bold idea and its production was an undertaking of heroic propor-
tions. We endorse its goals and appreciate the varied and significant
accomplishments of its authors. Only time will tell if those ac-
complishments will be subverted by its subtle shortcomings.
247. See, for example, our discussion of the failure to connect research design with
significance testing, supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
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